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Abstract—Software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a technique to
isolate a potentially faulty or malicious software module from the
rest of a system using instruction-level rewriting. SFI implemen-
tations on CISC architectures, including Google Native Client,
use instruction padding to enforce an address layout invariant
and restrict control flow. However this padding decreases code
density and imposes runtime overhead. We analyze this overhead,
and show that it can be reduced by allowing some execution of
overlapping instructions, as long as those overlapping instructions
are still safe according to the original per-instruction policy.
We implemented this change for both 32-bit and 64-bit x86
versions of Native Client, and analyzed why the performance
benefit is higher on 32-bit. The optimization leads to a consistent
decrease in the number of instructions executed and savings
averaging 8.6% in execution time (over compatible benchmarks
from SPECint2006) for x86-32. We describe how to modify the
validation algorithm to check the more permissive policy, and
extend a machine-checked Coq proof to confirm that the system’s
security is preserved.
I. INTRODUCTION
In application development it is desirable to have ex-
tensibility via integrating multiple (and possibly separately
developed) software modules. This lets an application achieve
new functionality or modify existing functionality with the
least change in its existing code. Browser plug-ins are good
examples of this approach. Although extensions give flexibility
for application development, protecting application security
is crucial, too. A buggy or malicious extension can subvert
the application. Software-based Fault Isolation (SFI) is an
effective solution that constrains an untrusted module by
loading and executing it with separated code and data segments
from the hosting application. SFI enforces security policies
which ensure that the untrusted code can only access its own
resources and can only invoke a list of pre-approved system
calls.
Native Client (NaCl for short) [22] is a Google Chrome
browser service that allows incorporating native (e.g., x86)
code into a web application. This gives the web application
the computational performance of native code. To protect the
browser’s security from potentially buggy or malicious native
code, NaCl enforces a sandboxing policy. This policy ensures
the native code executes just within its own code, accesses just
its own data, and communicates with the browser just through
predefined interfaces. To be NaCl-compatible, native code
needs to be compiled with the NaCl build chain. The NaCl
compiler inserts checking instructions and aligns instructions
to enforce sandboxing policies. A validator is responsible for
checking policy adherence before the native code may execute.
NaCl implements SFI for both CISC (x86-32 and x64)
and RISC (ARM and MIPS) architectures. This gives the
browser native-code performance across the most common
underlying architectures. In the CISC implementation, NaCl
incorporates a conservative instruction padding scheme like the
one first proposed in PittSFIeld [7]. While this padding scheme
is crucial to enforce the sandboxing policy (via instruction
alignment), it imposes a runtime overhead on the execution
by introducing more instructions to be executed and reducing
the effectiveness of instruction caching and prefetching.
In this paper we improve performance by changing the NaCl
padding scheme. In addition to implementing our changes in
the instruction alignment of the NaCl build chain, we changed
the validator appropriately to ensure our changes do not disrupt
NaCl sandboxing policy enforcement. We implemented and
evaluated our padding scheme for both x86-32 and x64 NaCl,
the two NaCl architectures that use artificial alignment. We
chose NaCl for our evaluation because it is well-known and
represents the state of the art, but a similar change would apply
to other systems that use artificial alignment to limit control
flow.
In May 2017, Google announced that it is phasing out
support for NaCl in most parts of Google Chrome/Chromium
in favor of WebAssembly, which has better cross-browser
support [9]. This is an understandable choice because Chrome
already has a JavaScript JIT in its trusted computing base
(TCB), but the static compilation and small verification TCB
offered by SFI are appealing in other contexts as well. For
instance, NaCl has also been applied to provide isolation for
distributed analytics [12] and edge clouds [6], and for native
libraries included in the JDK [15] or used in Android apps [2].
We proved the correctness of the changed validator using
the Coq proof assistant [13]. For this project, we incorporated
a greedy algorithm for padding instructions. Our evaluations
show that changing the padding scheme can improve code
performance, though in some cases the analysis is complicated
by other CPU optimizations like branch prediction. To support
performance analysis we adapted the Valgrind/Cachegrind tool
to monitor Native Client execution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II
we discuss some background notions essential to the rest of the
paper. In Section III we survey previous projects related to SFI.
In Section IV we discuss our changes to the NaCl build chain
and validator. Section V describes our evaluation method and
presents the results and their analysis. Section VI talks about
some technical obstacles we faced during this project and the
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ways we solved them; and Sections VII and VIII present the
future work and the conclusion, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we go through some related background.
First we introduce the notion of Software-based Fault Isolation
(SFI) and its advantages. Then we compare this to another
closely related security mechanism, and discuss branch pre-
diction in a CPU and its relevance to our project.
A. Software-Based Fault Isolation
In the context of software systems, fault isolation is the
ability to contain a potentially faulty module from other parts
of the system, meaning that untrusted module failure does
not affect other modules. In a more extreme case, even a
malicious untrusted module should not be able to interfere with
other modules’ functionality. One approach to this problem is
loading each module into a separate address space. This can
be supported by hardware, and guarantee there is no way to
access other modules’ resources, e.g. OS process isolation.
Such hardware-based isolation is robust but inefficient as
inter-module communication incurs context switch overhead.
Wahbe et al. [17] propose a software-based solution. In this ap-
proach isolation is provided within a single hardware address
space. The untrusted module has its own code and data region
(the sandbox), and is prohibited from jumping or accessing
other modules’ regions. This prohibition is implemented by
rewriting the untrusted module code to limit control transfer or
data access instructions. In case of direct addressing (like jmp
0x100019b), such instructions can be checked statically
even before the execution starts. That is because knowing the
destination address enables the check (requiring non-writable
code during execution guarantees the checked address will not
change at runtime).
The key challenge is with indirect addressing (instructions
like jmp *%ecx or mov $0x63,(%ecx)); in these cases
the destination address cannot be resolved until the point of
instruction execution. Therefore SFI inserts some checking
instructions to ensure the register contains a valid address. The
challenge is that these checks must be efficient and unable to
be bypassed. In Section III we will go through different SFI
techniques that address this challenge.
A related security mechanism is Control Flow Integrity
(CFI) which first was proposed by Abadi et al. [1]. CFI tries
to enforce control flow graph (CFG) integrity by restricting
all indirect control transfers to go only to intended targets. In
the original approach of Abadi et al., a system first statically
determines valid targets for call and return instructions. To
enforce the extracted CFG, an ID is used for valid targets and
is placed right before the target location. Then each indirect
call and return instruction is instrumented to first check the
target address ID and to jump only if the ID is correct. This
technique also requires non-writable code because IDs must
be tamper-proof and non-reproducible.
Compared to SFI, CFI enforces a smaller set of places an
indirect jump can target. In SFI it is sufficient that no indirect
control flow evades the sandboxed code region, but in CFI it is
further required that the address be an intended target address.
SFI is sometimes described as being based on a weak form of
CFI, where the set of valid targets is all the sandboxed area.
However the control-flow enforcement used in SFI would not
be a strong CFI technique, and the data protection that SFI
provides is also needed in isolation applications.
B. Branch Prediction
In micro-architecture design, branch prediction is important
to hide latency and allow instruction level parallelism and
therefore improved performance. A poor branch prediction
can harm performance as every misprediction disrupts the
instruction pipeline. Branch prediction includes predicting
the direction and target of a branch. Direction prediction
means anticipating whether the branch transfers control or
falls through, while target prediction means determining where
the control is going if the branch is taken. There are many
prediction techniques discussed in the architecture literature,
e.g [4], [5], [16].
As indirect branches are important in SFI, and we found
it significant in some of our benchmarks (section V), we
focus on indirect branch prediction. For direction prediction,
indirect branches are statically predicted to be always taken.
The most widely used target predictor for indirect branches
is a branch target buffer (BTB) [4]. A BTB is a cache-like
structure indexed by instruction address. It stores the last
used target address for a branch instruction. As the size of
a BTB is limited, it can suffer from capacity and collision
misses. In most modern CPUs (like Intel Sandy Bridge as
our test machine) there is a BTB for indirect branch target
prediction (but the size and indexing function are not officially
documented).
As return addresses are the most common form of indirect
branches, a return-address stack [20] is provided in CPUs as a
separate structure to resolve return addresses early. Naturally it
is a stack where on a function call the return address is pushed
and on a function return the address is popped. The advantage
of a return-address stack over a BTB is evident for functions
that are called from multiple call sites. While the BTB just
can predict the return from the last call, a return-address stack
can remember the returns as long as its size allows.
III. RELATED WORK
Software-Based Fault Isolation The notion of Software-
Based Fault Isolation was first introduced by Wahbe et al. [17].
Their idea of protecting code and data integrity was directing
an unsafe instruction (i.e. indirect jump or memory write1)
through a dedicated register and masking the register value
appropriately at runtime. First they defined an unsafe instruc-
tion as any instruction which jumps or writes to an address
that cannot be resolved before execution begins. Then they
divide an application’s address space into a code segment and
1This work and many subsequent ones consider data reads less harmful, so
to avoid higher overhead they tend to not cover secret data protection as a
design goal.
2
a data segment where all addresses inside a segment have the
same upper bits. The policy is that an untrusted application can
execute code only from its own code segment and can write
only into its own data segment. The implementation of such a
policy using dedicated registers is straightforward: before any
unsafe instruction, sandboxing instructions are inserted to set
the upper bits of the dedicated register to an appropriate value
and then the unsafe instruction is executed. As long as unsafe
instructions are preceded by the sandboxing instructions, the
execution is deemed safe. A verifier is provided to statically
check that such an invariant is respected.
PittSFIeld The original work on SFI was for RISC archi-
tectures, but on CISC architectures like x86, variable-length
instructions can lead to many different instruction streams.
An indirect jump can take control to any address in the code
segment and if the address is not the start of an intended
instruction, then a different stream of instructions can be
executed. To tackle this challenge, PittSFIeld [7] imposes an
artificial alignment on x86 instructions. Memory is divided
into bundles (called chunks by the PittSFIeld authors) of size
16 bytes, and jump instructions are only permitted to target
the beginning of a bundle. To enforce this property, every
indirect jump instruction is preceded by a checking instruction
to ensure the 4 lower bits of the target address are zero. In
addition, no instruction is allowed to cross bundle boundaries,
and the pair of a checking instruction and the following jump,
cannot be split across two different bundles. McCamant and
Morrisett proposed the use of no-ops to align the target of
a jump at the beginning of a bundle. This way control flow
cannot jump into the middle of an instruction and interpret
a different and unintended stream of instructions. To ensure
return address alignment, each call instruction must be the last
instruction of a bundle.
To avoid having the compiler and assembler in its trusted
code base, PittSFIeld ensures binaries comply with the security
policy via a static verifier. The verifier checks simple policies
(e.g. no indirect branch instruction may be at the beginning of
a bundle) before execution starts.
Native Client Native Client [22] is a project developed
by Google to let browser-based applications benefit from
the computational speed of native code. NaCl is a sandbox
permitting a native x86 binary (x64 and ARM binaries in
later versions) to be executed as a browser plug-in. It provides
operating system portability for untrusted native code while
preserving system security via data and code sandboxing.
NaCl consists of two main parts: an inner sandbox and an
outer sandbox. The inner sandbox is similar to PittSFIeld in
terms of constraining control flow using instruction alignment
in 32-byte bundles. To reduce runtime overhead, the inner
sandbox uses x86 segmented memory to contain memory
references. The outer sandbox is responsible for blocking side
effects by capturing system calls made by the process running
the native module. System calls issued by untrusted native
code are compared against a white list and only allowed ones
are permitted.
As the inner sandbox of NaCl is our interest in this
project, we elaborate on it in more detail. The inner sandbox
implements software-based fault isolation. Security rules are
embedded into a native binary via a modified version of the
gcc compilation toolchain. A static verifier validates that the
rules are followed by the native code just before loading. As
mentioned before, NaCl implements data sandboxing using
the segmented memory mechanism provided by the x86-32
architecture. This way there is no need to put extra instructions
to limit data load and stores. Using instruction alignment at 32-
byte bundles, NaCl makes sure that disassembling the binary
from start to end gives the only instruction stream visible to the
processor. Having such disassembly allows unsafe instructions
to be identified and prohibited. Some such unsafe instructions
include: syscall or int as the native code should not interact
with OS directly, lds as the native code is not allowed to update
segment registers, and ret as returning from function calls must
be implemented by a sandboxed indirect jump.
To constrain control flow, direct branches are computed
statically and checked to target an instruction identified during
disassembly. For indirect branches a combination of seg-
mented addressing and address masking guarantees that the
branch is sandboxed. Using the CS register the address is
constrained in the code segment and by masking the 5 lower
bits of the branch target address it will be pointing to a bundle
start.
The operation of the validator is crucial for security. The
NaCl validator is a small trusted library which is responsi-
ble for disassembling untrusted code and checking security
policies. Starting from the first instruction, the validator first
checks that it is a valid instruction, and that it is not crossing a
bundle boundary. Then, if it is an indirect branch, its preceding
masking instruction must be in the same bundle. For the case
of direct branches, the target address is calculated and stored
in an array. If all of these checks pass, the instruction’s address
is stored as a valid address. At the end all addresses in the
branch targets array are checked to be valid addresses.
The original proposal of NaCl was only for x86-32. In later
research Native Client was extended to the x64 and ARM
architectures [14]. The most challenging part of these ports
was the lack of the segmented memory feature of x86-32.
Therefore the authors decided to abandon sandboxing load
instructions and just use masked sandboxing and guard pages
on store instructions. Also in control flow containment, the
high-order bits are masked, too. For the case of x64, dedicating
a register to hold the sandboxed address, and reserving large
guard regions, helped in efficient implementation.
Because introducing bundles is a significant change to code
layout, it is most convenient to perform rewriting before
assembly as part of the compilation toolchain, when labels
are still symbolic; NaCl uses a modified version of the gas
assembler. Recent advances in tools that can recover symbolic
labels from stripped binaries [19], [18] could be used as a pre-
processing step to extend NaCl to off-the-shelf executables.
RockSalt The original version of NaCl’s verifier was a hand
written program in C, responsible for ensuring sandboxing
policies. As the policy enforcement is dependent on code
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disassembly, it is challenging to make sure the verifier is doing
its job right. To address this issue Morrisett et al. proposed
RockSalt, [8] a DFA-based verifier for NaCl. They built a
formal model of a large subset of the x86 instruction set and
proved verifier correctness on it. Their DFA-style verification
approach was also adopted into later versions of NaCl.
RockSalt is notable for having a very detailed model of an
SFI system, but some previous projects also applied formal
methods to SFI. The PittSFIeld project [7] formalized 7
instructions of x86 and proved SFI policies are respected
by those instructions. Earlier Winwood and Chakravarty [21]
provided a machine-checked proof using Isabelle/HOL for an
instruction rewriting technique for RISC architecture. Their
method replaces any indirect jump with a direct jump into a
trusted dispatcher code.
Monitor Integrity Protection In more recent research,
Monitor Integrity Protection [10] is proposed. Here the authors
try to tackle the variable-length instruction problem with a
different approach. Instead of using no-ops to align instruc-
tions into fixed-sized chunks, they divide the code region into
variable-sized chunks and record the beginning of each chunk
in a bitmap named the chunk-table. All branches are restricted
to target only the beginning of a chunk. In case of direct
branches, such a property can be checked statically, and for
indirect branches a dynamic check looks up the chunk-table
to ensure the branch target is valid. Compared to alignment-
based techniques, MIP is more space efficient (as no no-ops
are used). Each MIP object in addition to code and data region,
contains a chunk-table. To support separate compilation, when
modules are combined, their chunk-tables are merged. The
authors implemented SFI using MIP and showed that it has
competitive performance with alignment-based SFI.
IV. NaCl ALLOWING CROSS-BUNDLE INSTRUCTIONS
Even though padding instructions (using no-ops) to aligned
addresses is an effective solution to variable length instructions
in CISC architectures, it has some drawbacks. The main dis-
advantage of inserting no-ops is harming instruction caching
and prefetching. As an example, consider a loop in which all
instructions in the loop can fit in the L1 instruction cache, but
once padded, some portion of the loop does not fit in the L1
cache anymore. In this scenario, every iteration of the loop will
cause instruction cache misses. Similarly instruction prefetch
is less effective as the code space becomes sparse. As no-ops
make actual instructions farther from each other, in each cycle
prefetch loads fewer actual instructions from the memory.
Another drawback of no-op instructions is wasting CPU
cycles once such instructions are loaded and executed. As
an optimization, NaCl will jump over any sequence of 16
bytes or longer of no-ops, to avoid CPU cycle waste. In
addition, padding the binary increases its size; this is not
desirable especially for NaCl where native modules need to be
first downloaded on a client machine and then executed. An
increase in binary size will result in an increase in download
time (though less with compression).
Algorithm 1 Greedy Pad Removal
1: procedure PAD REMOVAL(assemblyFile, padInfo)
2: for all pad in padInfo do
3: val← FALSE
4: savedSize← pad.size
5: succPad← padInfo.successor(pad)
6: savedSuccSize← succPad.size
7: pad.size← 0
8: while pad.size ≤ savedSize do
9: if succPad then
10: diff← savedSize − pad.size
11: succPad.size←
12: (savedSuccSize+ diff) % 32
13: nexe← BUILD(assemblyFile, padInfo)
14: val← validate(nexe)
15: if val = TRUE then
16: break
17: pad.size += 1
18: procedure BUILD(assemblyFile, padInfo)
19: objF ile← assemble(assemblyFile, padInfo)
20: nexe← link(objF ile)
21: return nexe
Considering these drawbacks encouraged us to look for
possible ways to reduce the number of no-ops used for
padding. So as the main idea of this project, we try to
remove unnecessary no-ops while still satisfying the same
safety requirements as in vanilla NaCl.
A. Changing NaCl Padding Scheme
In vanilla NaCl, an instruction will be padded in three cases:
1) if it is an indirect jump target, 2) if it is a call, or 3) if it
crosses a bundle boundary. In case 1, the instruction is aligned
at the beginning of the next 32-byte bundle. In case 2, the call
instruction is padded to be positioned at the end of a bundle.
In case 3, the instruction is padded to the beginning of the next
bundle. Cases 1 and 2 are necessary for sandboxing to preserve
the code’s behavior. Since the target of an indirect jump is
masked so that it will point to a 32-byte-aligned address, the
target instructions must be positioned at bundle starts. In case
2, the instruction after the call is the target of return instruction,
so pushing the call to the end of the bundle positions the target
instruction at the next bundle start. Case 3 pads instructions
which would otherwise start in one bundle and end in the
next bundle. This type of padding is to eliminate unintended
or invalid instructions. But it is conservative; we could allow a
cross-bundle instruction if we make sure no unsafe instruction
is interpretable from the crossing point. In this way we can
decrease the number of no-ops. From now on we use Cross-
Bundle Instruction (CBI) NaCl to refer to our changed version
of NaCl which relaxes the requirements of case 3.
The main challenge is deciding which no-ops can be
removed while ensuring the binary still passes the verifier.
It is an optimization problem, which for now we use a
greedy method to solve. For simplicity our approach reuses
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the validator with its standard interface. (As future work
we would like to explore other algorithms, mentioned in
Section VII.) In our method, for each padding of type 3 (cross-
bundle instruction), we start by removing the whole padding
sequence, and iteratively we increase the padding size by
one byte and check the effect on the validation. If validation
succeeds, it means no-op removal did not create any invalid
instructions, so we can replace the current padding with a
shorter one, and go to the next padding. Algorithm 1 shows
the pseudocode for greedy pad removal.
For each source code file, we retrieve assembly code using
the -S switch to gcc. We also made a change in the NaCl
build chain to extract information related to pad placement.
The modified assembler produces a sequence of entries each
of which consists of a location (saying which instruction is
padded), and a size (the length of the pad in bytes) which are
collected into a data structure named padInfo.
In Algorithm 1 the loop at line 2 keeps this invariant that at
the start of each iteration the padInfo leads to a valid binary.
For each element in padInfo we start by setting the size of
padding to zero and increase it one by one if necessary. In
order to evaluate just the effect of current padding size change,
the size difference will be added to the next element in the
padInfo (line 10). This way, in the inner loop (line 8) the whole
binary will be like the previous step except for the current
padding size change. Note that the addition is modulo bundle
size as we can remove any full bundle of no-ops. Another
perspective is that this approach moves padding instructions
towards the end of the file instead of removing them directly.
But in fact, in each iteration the accumulated pads are modulo
32, which means any pads over 32 will be shrunk, and also at
the end of the file, any remaining pads can be safely removed
without changing the binary’s validity.
B. Multipass Validator
The NaCl validator checks instructions in one pass starting
from the beginning of the code and going to the end. The
validator maintains two bitmaps: one for safe addresses to
jump to (named valid targets), and one for actual addresses
which the code will jump to (named jump targets). For each
instruction, it checks whether it is a valid instruction or not. If
it is valid, then the instruction address is marked in the valid
targets bitmap. If the instruction is a direct branch, the target
address is marked in the jump targets bitmap. In the case of
an indirect branch, the validator checks that it is preceded by
appropriate masking instructions. At the end of the validation
pass, the two bitmaps valid targets and jump targets are
compared to make sure all direct jumps are targeting valid
instructions.
Considering our changes in the NaCl padding scheme, we
need to make changes in the validator to cover all possible
instruction streams. As we are allowing cross bundle instruc-
tions, we must make sure that any instruction stream starting
from the crossing point will not reach an invalid instruction. To
do this we validate a binary in multiple passes. Each validation
pass starts from a bundle start (as the bundle start is the
Algorithm 2 Multipass Validator
1: procedure VALIDATE(code, size)
2: initialize two arrays of size size named valid and
target to FALSE
3: bundleStart← 0
4: result← TRUE
5: while bundleStart < size do
6: pos← bundleStart
7: while pos < size && !valid[pos] do
8: valid[pos]← TRUE
9: savedPos← pos
10: if match maskedJump insn( code, &pos,
11: size) then
12: continue
13: if match nonControlFlow insn(code,
14: &pos, size) then
15: continue
16: if match directJump insn(code, &pos,
17: size) then
18: dst← extract dest(code, savedPos,
19: pos, size)
20: target[dst]← TRUE
21: continue
22: return FALSE
23: bundleStart += 32
24: for i = 0 to size do
25: if target[i] && !valid[i] then
26: result← FALSE
27: if i is 5-bit aligned && !valid[i] then
28: result← FALSE
29: return result
possible crossing point); and in each pass, the validation is
the same as vanilla NaCl. Algorithm 2 presents the multipass
validator pseudocode which is an adaptation of RockSalt’s
validator [8]. The changes from the RockSalt algorithm are
highlighted in gray.
The Validate procedure takes two parameters, a pointer to
the code location, and the size of the code. At line 2, two
arrays (valid and target) of size of the code are initialized to
FALSE. The valid array is used to mark all valid instructions
addresses (which in turn can be valid jump destinations). The
target array records those addresses that are jumped to by
some direct jump or call instructions.
Two nested while loops at lines 5 and 7 are responsible for
going through the code in multiple passes and validating all
possible addresses which can be the start of an instruction.
The while loop at line 5 iterates over all aligned addresses
(bundle starts), and in each iteration it validates instruction
streams beginning from the bundle start. The inner loop at
line 7, executes if the address in pos has not already been
validated. If it was, it means the instruction stream was seen
in previous iterations and there is no need to be re-validated.
Otherwise, for each address in pos, the algorithm tries to
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match the bytes in code starting from pos against the three
classes of instructions (masked jump, non-control flow, and
direct jump). Once matched, pos is advanced by the size of
matched instruction and the process goes to the next iteration.
The match maskedJump insn procedure matches a masking
instruction on register r followed by an indirect call or jump
through r (line 10). The match nonControlFlow insn proce-
dure matches any instruction allowed by NaCl which does
not affect control flow (line 13). The match directJump insn
procedure matches direct call or jump instructions (line 16).
When this procedure is matched, the extract dst procedure
extracts the target of the direct jump or call (line 18), and the
destination is recorded in the target array (line 20). When the
while loops finishes, the algorithm checks at line 25 that each
target address is a valid address, and at line 27, it checks that
each aligned address is the beginning of a valid instruction.
The vanilla NaCl validator processes a binary in linear
time (proportional to the code size). Making multiple passes
makes validation more expensive, but it is still asymptotically
linear. It might seem the nested loops would have quadratic
complexity. However there can be a limited number of distinct
execution streams in the same code bytes: eventually most
streams will have to converge. Once an execution stream
converges with an already-validated instruction stream, the rest
of the already-validated stream does not need to be rechecked.
Algorithm 2 implements this optimization by checking the
flags in the valid array. If the valid flag for the current address
is already set, the validation of the current stream stops and we
return to the outer loop. Each iteration of the inner loop marks
a previously-unseen instruction, and instructions are never
unmarked, so every byte of the code will be processed (as
start of an instruction) at most once. The worst-case number
of instruction checks increases from the number of intended
instructions in the code, to the number of byte locations in the
code, but the validator running time is still linear in the binary
size.
The optimization of not rechecking already-validated in-
structions does not change the validator result because all
of the operations performed when checking an instruction
are idempotent. In other words, performing them once has
the same effect as performing them repeatedly: the matching
result depends only on the instruction bytes, which do not
change, and once flags in the target array are set, they stay
set. The sequence of remaining instructions in a stream is
uniquely determined from any address in the stream. When
the algorithm encounters an already-processed instruction, it
is equivalent to skip the checking of the rest of the stream,
because all of the result of that checking have already been
recorded. The match maskedJump insn check treats two x86
instructions as one pseudo-instruction, where jumping directly
to the second of the two instructions would be unsafe. The
algorithm treats this in the same way as an unsafe instruction
found by interpreting bytes within a single x86 instruction:
the second instruction is not valid on its own, so validation
will fail if it is reachable in any other way, including by a
direct jump, by occurring at a bundle boundary, or along an
overlapping-instruction stream.
C. Correctness of the Multipass Validator
After describing the changes made in NaCl, here we argue
why our changes do not violate NaCl sandboxing policies. The
NaCl validator is responsible for policy enforcement. If we can
show that despite our changes, the validator still enforces the
sandboxing policies correctly, then we are done.
The RockSalt [8] authors proved the correctness of their
validator which in turn reflected in the current NaCl validator.
So we can assume that the NaCl validator is correct and will
argue that our changes on making the validation process mul-
tipass does not disrupt the validator correctness. The proof in
[8] relies on the fact that during the binary execution contents
of segment registers are not changed from the initialization
moment and also the bytes in the code segment are not altered
after being validated.
The validator prevents untrusted code from updating seg-
ment registers by filtering such instructions. As we did not
change set of forbidden instructions, therefore the multipass
validator provides same protection. This way, if the untrusted
binary is loaded in an appropriate environment as long as the
instruction pointed to by pc (program counter register) is valid,
the sandboxing policy is satisfied. The multipass validator
covers all addresses that can ever be an instruction address.
That is because for the case of direct jumps, the loop at line
20 of Algorithm 2 makes sure jump destinations are valid
instructions; and for the case of indirect jumps (as they are
just allowed to target aligned addresses) the outer loop at line
5 covers all aligned bundle starts. So based on our changes, if
the multipass validator returns TRUE on a binary, it means in
every pass staring from a bundle start, the validator deemed
the instruction stream to be in accordance with the sandboxing
policy.
To get a machine-checked verification of our reasoning,
we have also formalized the above argument in the Coq [13]
proof assistant as a modification to the previous RockSalt [8]
proof. The original RockSalt proof modeled a single-pass
validator, so we modified it to model a multipass validator
as in Algorithm 2. Loops are modeled as recursive functions
in Coq, and we reused the function implementing the loop of
the single-pass validator as the inner loop of the multipass
validator (the model does not include the optimization of
exiting the inner loop early when encountering an already-
validated instruction). We then inserted a new recursive func-
tion corresponding to the outer loop that starts a verification
pass at each bundle start address. To allow the rest of the proof
to work with this change, we had to inductively prove several
properties about the outer loop that were already proved for
the inner loop, for instance that when an instruction was added
to the valid bitmap, it was within the range of the code region
and was in fact the address of a valid instruction. In total
we changed about 20 lines of the model and wrote about 650
lines of new lemmas and their proofs. The proof is available at
https://pastebin.com/gN026Hte. With these changes, the secu-
rity guarantee proved for RockSalt applies with the same force
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for our modified approach, so we have a strong assurance that
allowing cross-bundle instructions does not decrease security.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate our changes to Native Client we used the SPEC
CPU suite (a standard set of CPU-intensive programs). We
began with SPECint2000 as it was used in the NaCl papers
[22], [14]. We then decided to move on to SPECint2006 as it
consists of benchmarks with bigger code sizes. We expected
our CBI NaCl to show better performance on bigger binaries
that have higher instruction-cache pressure. (We also looked
into the recently-released SPEC CPU 2017 suite, but it appears
to have more severe porting obstacles related to Native Client’s
older GCC version and memory usage limits.) We used GCC
version 4.4.3, and the test machine was an Intel Core i7-
3770 (Sandy Bridge) CPU at 3.40GHz, with 16GB of memory,
running Ubuntu 16.04.
We made a virtual machine containing the CBI NaCl soft-
ware (source code, compiled binaries, and scripts) which can
be accessed at https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/∼emamd001/
cbi-nacl.html.
A. Results for SPECint2000
The SPECint2000 package consists of 12 programs (11
written in C and one in C++). We built these benchmarks
on x86-32 architecture and measured the running time of
each sample. Figure 1 shows the running time overhead
comparison for the SPECint benchmarks as built by GNU
GCC, vanilla NaCl, and CBI NaCl compilers. Each benchmark
was run 11 times, and after discarding the first result, the
average running time for 10 runs was reported. The best case
overhead reduction is for gap with 17.9% and on average
CBI NaCl binaries show 4.78% improvement in running time.
For the case of perlbmk CBI NaCl binary we observed an
increased runtime overhead of 0.8%. This increased overhead
is unexpected, and we describe a more detailed investigation
in V-C.
Table I shows the code size of the benchmarks for each
compiler in bytes. As it can be seen, except in two cases,
our changed compiler generated a smaller binary compared to
vanilla NaCl. This size difference is due to pad removal, as we
did not change the data layout of binaries and only changed
the code layout. For the cases of 181.mcf and 252.eon we
see a small increase in the binary size of CBI NaCl. That is
because at the time of compilation, we put a bundle (32 bytes)
of NOP instructions at the end of each object file. These extra
bundles are placed to merge the validation paths once all the
object files are linked together to build the final binary. For
these two benchmarks, the size of the extra bundles exceeds
the number of bytes removed from the padding. But as these
NOP bundles are placed after the last instruction of the last
function of each object file, they will not be executed and have
no effect on the number of actually executed instructions.
Table II shows the number of instructions executed by each
benchmark at runtime. These numbers are collected by running
each sandboxed benchmark under Valgrind/Cachegrind tool.
TABLE I: Code size for SPECint CPU2000 in bytes.
Benchmark GNU GCC Vanilla NaCl CBI NaCl
164.gzip 97,816 244,205 243,889
175.vpr 254,574 622,047 621,683
176.gcc 2,030,316 5,598,520 5,598,512
181.mcf 29,405 92,248 92,464
186.crafty 333,524 699,416 699,176
197.parser 276,651 784,118 782,806
252.eon 575,211 4,840,324 4,844,416
253.perlbmk 829,860 2,444,380 2,441,480
254.gap 956,543 2,273,206 2,268,190
255.vortex 754,974 2,070,729 2,067,929
256.bzip2 96,640 207,686 206,438
300.twolf 415,700 1,056,335 1,055,975
TABLE II: Number of runtime instructions for SPECint
CPU2000.
Vanilla NaCl CBI NaCl Decrease
164.gzip 438,584,902,313 429,015,758,807 2.8%
175.vpr 200,396,220,469 200,384,630,579 <0.1%
176.gcc 175,502,236,335 174,171,040,934 0.7%
181.mcf 55,730,276,258 54,432,114,188 2.3%
186.crafty 226,135,233,139 223,841,297,154 1.0%
197.parser 342,435,548,778 340,426,993,766 0.5%
252.eon 215,902,254,049 215,902,222,993 1.4%
253.perlbmk 400,334,639,815 396,991,025,588 0.8%
254.gap 248,434,693,423 245,972,158,831 1.0%
255.vortex 380,247,713,301 374,391,454,899 1.5%
256.bzip2 348,260,041,064 343,301,990,583 1.4%
300.twolf 351,235,815,588 347,811,831,402 1.0%
As shown, our pad removal decreased the number of in-
structions executed. The removed instructions are the padding
instructions which have no effect on the benchmark’s func-
tionality.
We should mention that as we are using a greedy method
for pad removal, the result may be sub-optimal and therefore
the overhead reduction may not be the best possible. But still
these results confirm the effect of pad removal on improving
performance. To determine an upper bound on how much
performance benefit we can get by any approach to remove
type 3 padding (such as replacing our current greedy algorithm
with a globally-optimal one), we did the following experiment.
We recompiled all 12 SPECint2000 benchmarks with the NaCl
build chain but removed all type 3 padding. This is not secure
and the generated binaries are rightfully rejected by the NaCl
validator, but we can still measure their performance overhead.
We executed these generated binaries 11 times and reported
the average running time of the last 10 executions. The fourth
column in figure 1 depicts this result. This experiment showed
that type 3 pad removal yields about 5.3% overhead reduction
on average. Comparing this result to CBI NaCl running time
confirms that our current approach achieves more than 90%
of the possible running time improvement.
B. Results for SPECint2006
As the performance improvements for SPECint2000 were
unsatisfying, we decided to next consider the newer
SPECint2006 suite. We believed as most of the SPECint2000
benchmarks have relatively smaller code sizes, they could
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Fig. 1: Running time overhead comparison for SPECint2000 (normalized with respect to vanilla NaCl)
fit mostly in current CPU instruction caches. So we were
interested to see how using a set of benchmarks with bigger
code sizes could affect the performance improvement.
SPECint2006 consists of 12 benchmarks (9 in C, and 3
in C++). We managed to build 10 of these benchmarks and
measured the running time for 4 different compile setups.
We could not successfully execute one of these benchmarks
(400.perlbench) inside the sandbox (neither vanilla NaCl, nor
CBI NaCl) and one other benchmark (483.xalancbmk) failed
even to compile using g++ 4.4.3.
Figure 2 shows the running time overhead comparison of
SPECint2006 benchmarks. Each benchmark was run 11 times,
and after discarding the first run, the average running time
of 10 runs was reported. The average overhead reduction is
8.6% which shows a meaningful performance improvement
compared to V-A. As we mentioned before, we hypothesize
that the bigger code sizes of SPECint2006 are a significant
reason for such differences. The best case overhead reduction
is for mcf with 21.8%.
Table III depicts the number of instructions executed of
benchmarks for each compiler. For this experiment we were
not able to monitor SPEC2006 benchmarks under Valgrind
because these benchmarks required a larger address space to
run, conflicting with Valgrind’s memory allocation scheme.
Therefore we used OProfile (a statistical profiler for Linux
binaries) [11] to estimate the number of retired instructions
with a sampling rate of 106. This table shows the CBI binaries
executed on average 15% fewer instructions at runtime.
C. Investigating the Anomaly
As figures 1 and 2 show, in some cases, pad removal
unexpectedly caused a slightly increased overhead. To investi-
gate the cause, we investigated more detailed profiling of the
benchmark execution. These results suggest address-dependent
TABLE III: Number of runtime instructions for SPECint
CPU2006.
Vanilla NaCl CBI NaCl Decrease
401.bzip2 3,379,347 ×106 2,917,477×106 13.6%
403.gcc 1,799,683×106 1,402,218×106 22.0%
429.mcf 563,035×106 423,872×106 24.7%
445.gobmk 2,400,400×106 1,957,218×106 18.4%
456.hmmer 4,452,957×106 3,564,759×106 19.9%
458.sjeng 3,276,737×106 2,734,397×106 16.5%
462.libquantum 2,992,638×106 2,974,543×106 0.6%
464.h264ref 4,688,793×106 3,991,415×106 14.8%
471.omnetpp 943,026×106 846,961×106 10.1%
473.astar 1,625,798×106 1,491,833×106 8.2%
indirect branch prediction as a source of performance varia-
tion.
We first made some changes in the NaCl (described in
section VI) to be able to run under Valgrind/Cachegrind.
Though Cachegrind has the advantage of not requiring statis-
tical sampling, its results did not seem very predictive of per-
formance overhead. From further investigation we hypothesize
that this is because its simulation of indirect branch prediction
is currently relatively simplistic: it uses a direct-mapped cache
indexed by the low 9 bits of an instruction address, which is
much simpler than the BTB in a modern CPU.
Therefore we used OProfile to estimate some interesting
events for each benchmark execution (events include the num-
ber of instructions retired, instruction cache misses, branch
misprediction, etc). From the OProfile logs we observed there
is an increase in the number of branch mispredictions for the
case of our CBI NaCl compiled binaries. So we hypothesized
that our pad removal had an unpredictable side effect on
indirect branch prediction success. That could be the case
because once we remove padding, instruction addresses will
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Fig. 2: Running time overhead comparison for compatible benchmarks from SPECint2006 (normalized with respect to vanilla
NaCl)
change. Indirect branch prediction (via the BTB) is dependent
on the address of indirect branch, so changes to collisions in
the BTB may increase the miss rate.
A small change in a program can perturb its layout which
affects the cache and branch predictors in complex ways. To
confirm the effect of branch misprediction on runtime, we
took an approach like one proposed by Curtsinger et al. [3]
to generate multiple samples of the SPECint2000 perlbmk
benchmark with randomized layout. We changed the way the
assembler places indirect call instructions in a bundle. One
layout is like vanilla NaCl, meaning that an indirect call
instruction is placed at the end of current bundle. Another
layout placed the indirect call instruction at the end of a new
bundle. Then, the assembler randomly selects one of these
layouts for each indirect call instruction. This way we can
produce different versions of same benchmark binary with
different instruction address layout.
We build 80 different versions of perlbmk binaries (for
vanilla NaCl and CBI). Then we monitored these samples’
execution under OProfile and collected the number of instruc-
tions retired, number of indirect branch mispredictions, and
CPU clock cycles. To separate the effects of changing the num-
ber of instructions executed and the number of mispredicted
branches, we fit a linear relationship shown in (1) between
these variables. The coefficient x is the number of cycles per
instruction, while y is the penalty in cycles for a mispredicted
indirect branch.
(CPU cycles) = x× (# of insns) + y × (# of mispredictions) (1)
These variables turn out to be strongly related; the linear fit is
shown graphically in Figure 3. With these three variables the
R2 statistic is 0.904; x is 0.388 CPI, while y is a 35.8 cycle
misprediction penalty. By comparison, if the mispredictions
are omitted, the R2 is only 0.796.
These results suggest that the cause of the anomaly was an
increased number of indirect branch mispredictions. In some
cases, pad removal may affect the effectiveness of the BTB
by changing the instruction address layout. To avoid this kind
of disruption, one might incorporate instruction re-ordering to
place indirect branch instructions at different addresses. We
leave investigating such remedies for future work.
D. What about x64?
The CBI NaCl approach is also applicable to the x64
architecture; unfortunately it provides much less benefit there.
The main reason is that the x64 validation rules allow fewer
instructions. Under x86-32 NaCl, most instructions that access
memory are allowed because the address will be checked with
segmentation at runtime. Under x64 NaCl, by contrast, only
a restricted set of addressing modes are legal, and because
of this, fewer overlapping instructions can be allowed. To
isolate and measure this effect in more detail, we performed an
experiment with random byte sequences. (Though overlapping
instructions are not truly random, they are outside our tool’s
control.) We generated 1 million bundle-length byte sequences,
and checked whether each sequence was legal under the rules
of the x86-32 or x64 validators. On average 9.1% of random
byte sequences are allowed on x86-32, while only 0.37% are
allowed on x64.
We have also implemented CBI NaCl for x64 and evaluated
its performance effect. However the performance benefit is
small, averaging less than 0.5%. Examining the binaries, our
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Fig. 3: Correlation between CPU Clock Cycles and Indirect Branch Misprediction for perlbmk
system was rarely able to remove padding, confirming the
effect suggested by the random-byte-sequence experiment.
VI. CHALLENGES
In this section we talk about further implementation details
of the project which were necessary to accomplish our main
goals.
A. On Generating Valid NaCl Binaries
As mentioned in Section IV-A, Algorithm 1 processes each
source code file one by one and tries to remove padding as
much as possible, while maintaining the invariant that the
object file passes validation. Then these object files are linked
into a complete nexe executable. Maintaining this standard C
separate compilation approach in padding removal is helpful
for scalability, but it requires that the linking step not break
validation.
The assembler is the tool that puts instructions in the object
file and determines the relative address of instructions. We
implemented the padding removal by changing the way gas
puts padding into the object file. The binary content is the
same from object file to final nexe except for the relocation
entries which are filled in by the linker. Once pad removal
decides appropriate padding for all source code files, their
corresponding object files are linked together to generate the
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final nexe, and this final nexe is passed to the validator to make
sure the generated nexe is a valid one. The final linking step is
where relocations (like function names or jump destinations)
are resolved to actual addresses inside the binary. This means
relocations are replaced by addresses, so the byte stream
which the final validation sees is different from the streams
validated in intermediate validations. So if we are not careful,
it may happen when the relocations are replaced by actual
values, the changed bytes may be interpreted to form an unsafe
instruction.
To avoid such situations, we wish to be conservative toward
labels and avoid having paths with labels crossing the bundle
boundaries. Conceptually, we would like the validation of a
single object file to fail if any value for a relocation address
would cause validation to fail. To approximate this check using
the existing validator, we replace labels with byte values that
are most likely to cause validation to fail if they are interpreted
as an instruction. Specifically, in intermediate steps we replace
labels with the hex bytes c3 c3 c3 c3. 0xc3 is the opcode
for a one-byte ret instruction, which is prohibited by the
validator. Thus if any location inside the label could be reached
as an instruction, we conservatively reject the layout. (The
change is made only for the purposes of validation testing,
not in the object file used for linking, because the label bytes
can contain information used by the linker.)
However this approach is not quite complete: for instance in
SPECint2000, it fails for two benchmarks (crafty and vortex).
The failure occurs when a byte from a label is interpreted not
as an opcode but as a mod-r/m byte, which affects the length
of an instruction and in turn the stream of later instructions.
We handled this case by generalizing the 0xc3 approach to
allow re-testing per-object validation with other byte values
as well. Since this problem is relatively rare, our system
first attempts to compile a binary testing with just 0xc3. If
validation fails after linking, our system extracts the label byte
value that led to the validation failure, adds it to the testing
set, and retries the compilation. For SPECint2000 crafty and
vortex, final validation succeeds with the addition of 0x9f
or 0xbf respectively. While building SPECint2006, the tool
found other filtered bytes for three more benchmarks. It found
0xa0 for gcc, 0xe0 for gobmk, and both 0xa0 and 0x20
for h264ref.
B. On Adapting Valgrind to Run on NaCl
As we mentioned in section V, it was appealing to us to be
able to monitor a NaCl sandboxed binary under Valgrind: the
Valgrind-based cachegrind tool simulates a binary’s interaction
with the system cache and branch predictor), and Valgrind is
also useful for other kinds of debugging. The NaCl project
provides scripts to let developers run Valgrind/Memcheck and
ThreadSanitizer on x64 versions of NaCl binaries. But our
need was to run Valgrind’s Cachegrind on x86-32 binaries.
The way NaCl loads the sandboxed binary into the mem-
ory, and the use of segment-based addressing are the main
obstacles to running Valgrind/Cachegrind on NaCl. NaCl first
allocates a memory region with a random base address, then
initializes the segment registers appropriately, and then uses
an ljmp instruction to jump into the sandbox.
We decided to disable segment-based addressing in NaCl
during Valgrind debugging. At a high level, the changes we
made are that first we fixed the base address that NaCl loads
the binary into, and then report address zero as the virtual
address. In this way the base address of the segments will
become zero (i.e. there is no need to use the base address
of segment registers for correct addressing). We then located
the NaCl code which updates segment registers and transfers
the control into and out of the sandbox. We replace this code
with equivalent instruction that do not change segments. For
example we replace every usage of the lss instruction (which
loads %esp and the stack segment register %ss) with regular
mov instruction to load an offset into %esp. As another
example we replaced every instruction working with %cs (like
ljmp or lcall) with a regular jmp or call via the offset.
With these changes we were able to load and execute a sand-
boxed binary with NaCl under Valgrind. Using the Cachegrind
tool, we were able to count the number of instructions executed
by each benchmark at runtime (Table II).
Even though with the aforementioned changes we were
able to execute NaCl under Valgrind, still the debugging
information of the untrusted code was not loaded. This made
it difficult to connect the results to the original source code.
The reason was in the way Valgrind and NaCl load the binary.
First the untrusted code is loaded to a temporary address (with
read-only permission), then NaCl copies the code into the
sandboxing area with appropriate permissions (code section
with rx and data section with rw). This causes Valgrind
to lose the association between debugging information and
the execution addresses. As mentioned before, we fixed the
untrusted binary execution location, so when Valgrind tries to
load the untrusted binary at first, we force it to look for the
debugging information, and if present, load it and associate it
with the execution location of the untrusted binary. This way
we made it possible to execute NaCl under Valgrind. It can be
helpful for debugging purposes as the behavior of untrusted
code can be monitored inside the sandbox, a capability which
was not available before.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Next we enumerate a few open directions for further re-
search. The greedy algorithm for choosing padding instruc-
tions to remove (Algorithm 1) already appears to achieve a
good proportion of the available overhead reduction, and it is
straightforward to implement because it reuses the validator
using its existing interface. However repeatedly re-validating
portions of object files is inefficient, and there is no guarantee
that the greedy approach will leave a minimal number of
padding bytes overall. Intuitively, we expect that an efficient
algorithm that is close to optimal in removing padding should
be possible by taking a dynamic programming approach. The
key observation is that for the most part, the validation of an
instruction does not depend on its entire address, only on its
position relative to a bundle boundary, i.e. its address modulo
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32. For instance, there is never a reason to pad by more
than 31 bytes. Thus considering 32 (equivalence classes of)
locations for each instruction is sufficient to choose locations
that globally minimize the need for padding bytes. Our upper
bound measurements of overhead when all type-3 padding is
removed give an idea of the maximum speedup that can be
achieved with better padding removal, though there are also
possible layout changes not covered by that upper bound, such
as re-ordering instructions (using semantically re-orderings, or
with added direct jumps). Such changes might also be used to
avoid conflicts that disrupt indirect branch prediction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the effect of padding on
the performance of Software-based Fault Isolation. We took
Native Client as one of the most recent and advanced imple-
mentations of SFI and changed its padding scheme while still
providing the same level of security. Our changes in the NaCl
padding scheme demonstrate the possibility of improving SFI
performance by avoiding conservative padding. This perfor-
mance improvement is a result of decrease in the number of
instructions executed and better use of instruction caches and
prefetch.
Based on our evaluations, because the binaries with bigger
code sizes put more pressure on the CPU instruction caches
and prefetch, our changes yield in higher performance im-
provement in such cases. As we reported, the running time
reduction for SPECint2006 was on average 8.6%, while this
reduction for SPECint2000 was on average 4.78%. These
results support our intuition about the negative effect of
instruction padding on instruction cache and prefetch.
The change in the NaCl padding scheme is implemented in
the NaCl assembler. An updated version of the NaCl validator
is provided to cover all the possible instruction streams of
the binary which the assembler generates. A formal proof
of correctness of this new validator is provided, too. In a
detailed performance analysis for x86-32 NaCl (supported by
a NaCl-compatible Valgrind tool), we noticed in some cases
the new address layout caused by pad removal can lead to
higher branch mispredictions. This in turn can cancel out
the performance benefits of executing fewer instructions or
suffering fewer instruction cache misses. We also implemented
the same modification for x64 NaCl code production and
validation. We found that few changes were needed to the
technique, but the performance benefit was less than for
x86-32 because fewer overlapping instructions can safely be
allowed to execute.
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APPENDIX
ROCKSALT PROOF DETAILS
The Coq code excerpts in Figures 4 and 5 show the
new definition we added to the RockSalt model, and a
key lemma we proved about it. The recursive function
process_buffer_align corresponds to the outer loop
of the multipass verification algorithm; an existing function
process_buffer_aux corresponds to the inner loop. We
modified the higher-level function process_buffer to call
the new function. The first of the sets returned by these
functions corresponds to the bitmap valid in Figure 2. The
lemma states that when an instruction address is added to the
valid set in a successful run of the validator, it must be that
there was a valid instruction at that address. The proof uses
induction over the execution of process_buffer_align,
and appeals to a similar lemma about the inner function
process_buffer_aux as well as a number of sub-lemmas
about arithmetic relationships and list-processing functions.
The full proof details are available online at https://pastebin.
com/gN026Hte .
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Fixpoint process_buffer_align (loc: int32) (n: nat) (tokens: list token_id)
(curr_res: Int32Set.t * Int32Set.t) :=
let (start_instrs, check_list) := curr_res in
match tokens with
| nil => Some curr_res
| _ => (* There are left over bytes in the buffer *)
match n with
| O => None
| S p =>
match process_buffer_aux loc n tokens (start_instrs, check_list) with
| None => None
| Some (start_instrs_new, check_list_new) =>
process_buffer_align ( loc +32_n Z.to_nat chunkSize)
p (skipn (Z.to_nat chunkSize) tokens)
(start_instrs_new, check_list_new)
end
end
end.
Definition process_buffer (buffer: list int8) :=
process_buffer_align (Word.repr 0) (length buffer) (List.map byte2token buffer)
(Int32Set.empty, Int32Set.empty).
Fig. 4: Parts of the RockSalt model added or changed to model the multipass validator
Lemma process_buffer_align_inversion :
forall n start tokens currStartAddrs currJmpTargets allStartAddrs allJmpTargets,
process_buffer_align start n tokens (currStartAddrs, currJmpTargets) =
Some (allStartAddrs, allJmpTargets)
-> noOverflow (start :: int32_of_nat (length tokens - 1) :: nil)
-> Z_of_nat (length tokens) <= w32modulus
-> forall pc:int32, Int32Set.In pc (Int32Set.diff allStartAddrs currStartAddrs)
-> exists tokens’, exists len, exists remaining,
tokens’ = (List.skipn (Zabs_nat (unsigned pc - unsigned start))
tokens) /\
goodDefaultPC_aux (pc +32_n len) start allStartAddrs
(length tokens) /\
(dfa_recognize non_cflow_dfa tokens’ = Some (len, remaining) \/
(dfa_recognize dir_cflow_dfa tokens’ = Some (len, remaining) /\
includeAllJmpTargets pc len tokens’ allJmpTargets) \/
dfa_recognize nacljmp_dfa tokens’ = Some (len, remaining)).
Fig. 5: A key new lemma proved about the multipass validator, analogous to one about the single-pass validator
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